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market	 acquirers	 earn	 a	 positive	 and	 statistically	 significant	 abnormal	 return	 of	
1,06%	when	achieving	control	of	emerging	market	targets.	Furthermore,	we	propose	
that	 labour	 laws	play	a	 significant	 role	 in	generating	abnormal	 returns	 in	a	 cross-
border	 M&A	 setting.	 When	 control	 is	 acquired,	 we	 find	 that	 social	 security	 law	
differences	 between	 countries	 are	 associated	 with	 higher	 abnormal	 returns	 in	 a	
developed	 market	 –	 emerging	 market	 setting,	 and	 labour	 law	 differences	 are	
associated	with	higher	abnormal	returns	in	an	emerging	market	–	emerging	market	
setting.	We	argue	that	these	results	reflect	efficiency	improvements	at	the	level	of	












































































internacionais.	Quando	 a	 empresa	 adquirente	 se	 encontra	 sediada	num	mercado	
emergente	e	a	empresa	adquirida	num	mercado	de	 fronteira,	 verificamos	que	os	
acionistas	da	empresa	adquirente	ganham	um	retorno	estatisticamente	significativo	
de	1,16%	quando	adquirem	 controlo.	Quando	a	 empresa	 adquirente	 se	 encontra	







mais	 elevados.	 Verificamos	 do	mesmo	modo	 que	 quando	 empresas	 sediadas	 em	
mercados	 emergentes	 adquirem	 controlo	 de	 empresas	 sediadas	 em	 mercados	
emergentes,	as	diferenças	a	nível	de	leis	de	contratação	estão	associadas	a	retornos	











































































Cette	 étude	 consiste	 dans	 l’implantation	 d’un	modèle	 de	marché	 par	 le	 biais	 du	
modèle	de	Markov	à	 changement,	dans	 le	but	d’étudier	 la	 génération	de	 retours	
anormaux	 dans	 un	 contexte	 de	 fusions	 et	 acquisitions	 internationales.	 Nos	
recherches	trouvent	que,	lorsque	l’entreprise	acheteuse	se	trouve	dans	un	marché	











marchés	 émergents	 acquièrent	 contrôle	 sur	 d’autres	 entreprises	 siégées	 dans	 les	
marchés	émergents,	 les	lois	du	travail	sont	associées	à	des	retours	anormaux	plus	
élevés.	Finalement,	on	argumente	 le	 fait	que	ces	résultats	reflètent	 l’amélioration	
efficace	 des	 niveaux	 de	 réduction	 de	 coûts	 de	 sécurité	 sociale	 ainsi	 que	 le	






















































































































































































































































































































































Mergers	 and	 Acquisitions	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	 studied	 and	 puzzling	 topics	 in	 the	
financial	 literature.	 It	 is	 a	 relevant	 subject	 to	 understand	 the	 behaviour	 and	






that	 depend	 on	 their	 jobs,	 the	 competitive	 forces	 and	 landscape	 that	 define	 the	










the	 event	 study	 methodology	 developed	 by	 Fama,	 et	 al.	 (1969).	 For	 example,	
consider	the	findings	of	Gregor,	Mitchell	and	Strafford	(2001	).	The	authors	show	that	
M&A	deals	tend	to	create	value	for	shareholders.	In	particular,	between	1973	and	
1998,	 the	 average	 3-day	 window	 abnormal	 return	 for	 acquirer	 and	 target	 firms	
combined	involved	in	M&A	deals	ranged	between	1.4%	and	2.6%.	Furthermore,	the	





seem	 to	 capture	 the	 same	 level	 of	 value.	 The	 authors	 find	 that	 the	 three-day	
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abnormal	return	for	the	acquiring	shareholders	is	statistically	indistinguishable	from	
0%	 over	 a	 short	 period	 event	 window.	 These	 results	 are	 puzzling,	 and	 therefore	
generate	further	questions.	First,	it	is	relevant	to	understand	if	all	types	of	acquirers	
and	 targets	 experience	 the	 same	 level	 of	 abnormal	 returns.	 Second,	 one	 should	




an	example	 the	 findings	of	Chari,	Ouimet	and	Tesar	 (2010).	The	authors	 find	 that	
when	firms	from	developed	markets	acquire	a	majority	stake	in	firms	from	emerging	
markets,	there	is	a	statistically	significant	positive	abnormal	return	of	1.16%	for	the	
acquiring	 firm	 shareholders.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 when	 the	 same	 acquirers	 from	
developed	markets	 acquire	 firms	 from	 developed	markets,	 abnormal	 returns	 are	
undistinguishable	from	0%.		
	
To	 answer	 the	 question	 regarding	 the	 measurement	 of	 abnormal	 returns,	 the	












of	 the	 most	 relevant	 questions	 empirical	 research	 can	 answer	 from	 a	 practical	
standpoint.	 The	 literature	 is	 again	 comprehensive	 in	 this	 regard.	 In	 particular,	





the	 purchase	 of	 undervalued	 assets.	 Dubious	 reasons	 include	 lowering	 financial	
costs,	risk	reduction	derived	from	diversification,	increasing	earnings	per	share,	and	
empire	 building.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 cross-border	 Mergers	 &	 Acquisitions,	 Chari,	
Ouimet	and	Tesar	 (2010)	have	 tackled	some	of	 these	questions.	 In	particular,	 the	
authors	argue	that	the	value	generation	originated	from	the	acquisition	of	emerging	
market	targets	could	stem	from	improved	corporate	governance.	The	authors	argue	
further	 that	 this	 is	 likely	 to	be	 an	even	more	 critical	 factor	 in	 an	 intangible	 asset	
production	context.	Corporate	governance	practices	are	largely	driven	by	legal	and	
institutional	features,	and	often	have	a	significant	impact	on	the	potential	for	cash	












majority	 stake	 in	 the	 target	 firm	 is	a	 critical	 factor	 to	generate	positive	abnormal	
returns	 for	 the	acquiring	 firm.	Although	 the	authors	 consider	 the	hypothesis	 that	
value	generation	stems	 from	the	 identification	of	undervalued	assets	 in	emerging	





practical	 application.	 Within	 the	 context	 of	 the	 legal	 environment	 of	 different	
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countries,	 what	 specifically	 leads	 acquiring	 firms	 to	 realise	 positive	 gains?	 For	
example,	Rossi	and	Volpin	(2004)	study	the	determinants	of	M&A	with	an	emphasis	
on	 law	 differentials.	 The	 authors	 find	 that	M&A	 activity	 is	 significantly	 higher	 in	
economies	with	good	accounting	standards	and	strong	shareholder	protection.	The	
authors	also	find	that	in	cross-border	deals,	the	target	firm	typically	originates	from	
a	 market	 with	 weaker	 investor	 protection	 legislation,	 which	 suggests	 that	 cross-
border	deals	also	play	a	governance	 role.	This	 is	 consistent	with	 the	argument	of	
Chari,	Ouimet	and	Tesar	(2010).	
	
The	 M&A	 literature	 is	 vast.	 The	 significance	 of	 empirical	 research	 for	 practical	




significant	 impact	on	 the	 job	creation	and	destruction	of	 the	 firms	 involved.	Even	


















of	 improved	 corporate	 governance	 and	 contract	 enforceability	 in	 intangible	 asset	
intensive	 industries,	 we	 propose	 a	more	 specific	 source	 of	 value	 in	 cross-border	
M&A.	In	particular,	we	explore	the	role	that	labour	laws	have	in	the	context	of	value	
generation.	If	it	is	true	that	Asset	Intangible	intensive	industries	mean	that	contract	
enforceability	 is	 important	 to	 generate	 value	 for	 firms,	 then	 labour	 intensive	
industries	can	also	potentially	yield	abnormal	returns	in	settings	where	labour	laws	








The	 remainder	 of	 this	work	 is	 organized	 as	 follows:	 Part	 II	 reviews	 the	 literature	
concerning	 Mergers	 &	 Acquisitions	 and	 the	 International	 Corporate	 Legal	
Environment;	Part	III	details	the	scope	of	this	work,	with	a	particular	emphasis	on	the	
research	 question	 addressed	 and	 the	 various	 econometric	 methodologies	
employable	 in	 the	 measurement	 of	 abnormal	 returns;	 Part	 IV	 provides	 specific	
details	 regarding	 the	 data	 usage	 and	 treatment,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 econometric	






This	 section	 provides	 a	 brief	 overview	 of	 the	 literature	 concerning	 Mergers	 &	
Acquisitions	 and	 the	 international	 contracting	 and	 legal	 environment	 of	 different	
countries.	Regarding	Mergers	and	Acquisitions,	our	goal	 is	dual.	 First,	we	provide	
some	historical	context	about	the	industry	trends.	Second,	we	provide	an	overview	
of	 important	empirical	 studies	both	 in	 the	context	of	 sources	of	value	creation	 in	
M&A	deals,	and	in	the	context	of	already	known	stylized	facts.	In	what	concerns	the	







The	 study	of	M&A	deals	over	 the	past	 century	has	 revealed	 two	 important	 facts:	
M&A	occurs	 in	waves,	and	deals	tend	to	cluster	by	 industry	(Gregor,	Mitchell	and	
Strafford	 2001	 ).	 We	 briefly	 present	 a	 historical	 overview	 of	 the	 defining	
characteristics	of	each	wave.	
	
	The	 first	wave	 occurred	 between	 1893	 and	 1904	 and	was	marked	 by	 horizontal	
mergers.	 This	 resulted	 in	 the	 emergence	 of	 large	 conglomerates	 and	monopolies	
































conglomerates	were	 formed	 once	 again,	 and	 cross-border	M&A	 began	 sprawling	
considerably.	 The	 opening	 of	 borders	 facilitated	 the	 potential	 for	 Foreign	 Direct	
Investment	 and	opened	 the	doors	 for	multinational	 corporations	 to	 expand	 their	






Globalization	 however	 was	 the	 main	 propeller	 of	 this	 wave,	 which	 heavily	









We	 make	 a	 final	 comment	 regarding	 industry	 clustering.	 Although	M&A	 activity	
tends	 to	 come	 in	waves,	 each	 one	 tends	 to	 be	 different	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 industry	
composition.	This	suggests	that	a	significant	portion	of	the	M&A	activity	is	generated	
from	 industry-level	 shocks	 (Gregor,	Mitchell	 and	 Strafford	 2001	 ).	 Some	 of	 these	
include	 technological	 innovations,	 supply	 shocks,	 and	 most	 importantly,	
deregulation.	In	particular,	the	latter	creates	substantial	investment	opportunities	in	



































































negative	 effects	 on	 capital	market	 efficiency	 of	 private	 benefits:	 legal,	 and	 extra-
judicial.	In	particular,	non-controlling	shareholders	can	use	legal	mechanisms	to	sue	
top	management.	 Alternatively,	 labour	 pressure	 and	 competition,	 as	 well	 as	 the	
development	 of	media	 and	 communication,	 can	 all	 act	 as	 important	 detrimental	
factors	in	the	appropriation	of	private	benefits.	Further	to	the	existing	literature,	we	
suggest	 that	 the	 negative	 impact	 on	 a	 firm’s	 image	 can	 overwhelm	 the	 potential	









sense	would	 be	 irrelevant	 since	 competitive	 organizational	 advantages	would	 be	
eliminated	 by	 costless	 contracting	 (Williamson	 1979).	 Moreover,	 the	 literature	
seems	to	be	consensual	in	the	argument	that	opportunism	is	paramount	in	the	study	
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of	 transaction	 costs,	 and	 that	 these	 are	 especially	 important	 when	 dealing	 with	
human	and	physical	capital	transactions.	Several	dimensions	have	been	identified	as	





Coase	 (1937)	 argues	 that	 a	 firm	 is	 a	 collection	 of	 implicit	 and	 explicit	 contracts	
between	managers	and	stakeholders.	The	author	argues	that	contracting	costs	must	
be	clearly	defined	when	considering	vertical	integration.	As	a	consequence,	efficient	
decisions	by	 top	management	might	 lead	 them	 to	 intrafirm	 rather	 than	 interfirm	
transactions	(Alchian,	Crawford	and	Klein	1978).	Moreover,	it	is	relevant	to	consider	
not	only	 the	explicit	 costs	of	 interfirm	 transactions,	 but	 also	 the	post-contractual	
costs	originating	for	example	from	opportunistic	behaviour.	This	is	an	exhaustively	













Another	 important	 subject	 in	 the	 literature,	 in	 particular	 related	 to	 corporate	
governance,	is	the	separation	between	ownership	and	control.	It	is	important	to	note	
that	 organizational	 imperatives	 are	 not	 the	 only	 factor	 that	 influences	 how	
ownership	and	governance	structures	within	a	 firm	are	defined.	 In	particular,	 the	
political	and	social	environment	in	which	a	firm	is	based	define	the	legislative	and	
cultural	 bodies	 which	 ultimately	 dictate	 how	 these	 aspects	 of	 governance	 must	
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costlier	 to	 solve	 through	 typical	 legal	mechanisms	 in	 those	 countries.	Moreover,	
politics	can	influence	the	decisions	of	managers	in	terms	of	employment,	or	other	









considered	 as	 functioning	 under	 a	 relationship	 system,	 or	 under	 an	Arm’s	 length	
system.	 The	 primary	 goal	 of	 a	 financial	 market	 is	 dual.	 In	 particular,	 it	 exists	 to	
efficiently	allocate	 resources	 to	 the	most	productive	uses,	and	 to	ensure	 that	 the	










capacity	 of	 a	 sole	 customer,	 or	 major	 supplier,	 the	 financier	 retains	 substantial	
influence	over	the	firm	and	in	effect,	controls	it.		However,	granting	a	monopoly	like	
structure	of	power	is	likely	to	require	the	creation	of	artificial	barriers	to	entry,	for	




the	 financier	 will	 be	 protected	 by	 explicitly	 defined	 contracts,	 which	 makes	
institutional	relationships	worth	less.	It	is	important	to	note	that	while	relationship	
based	systems	thrive	 in	environments	with	poor	 legal	definition,	 the	arm’s	 length	







































In	 what	 concerns	 Common	 Law,	 this	 stream	 is	 widely	 based	 on	 English	 Law.	
Precedents	 from	 legal	 decisions	 are	 typically	 at	 the	 core	 of	 common	 law	











common	 law	 countries.	 French	 civil	 law	 countries	 give	 investors	 the	 poorest	
protection	 rights.	 Regarding	 enforceability,	 Scandinavian	 and	 German	 civil	 law	
	 15	









distribute	 capital	 to	 investors,	 and	 which	 limit	 managerial	 expropriation.	 For	
example,	only	French	civil	law	countries	have	mandatory	dividend	policies.	As	a	result	
of	weak	 investor	 protection,	 often	weak	 legal	 protection	 countries	 exhibit	 higher	







laws	 are	 relevant	 in	 this	 context	 for	 at	 least	 two	 reasons:	 due	 to	 extensive	




internal	 transfer	prices,	 at	 lower	 than	market	prices.	 The	 resulting	asset	 sale	 and	
investor	dilution	is	 legal	 in	most	jurisdictions,	hence	the	weak	investor	protection.	
However,	 it	 has	 a	 materially	 negative	 impact	 on	 the	 wealth	 of	 those	 same	
shareholders.	From	the	theory	that	debt	and	equity	are	claims	to	cash	flows	from	a	
collection	 of	 projects	 that	 constitute	 a	 firm,	 a	 key	 question	 arises:	 what	 is	 the	






yield	 rights	 to	 the	 underlying	 cash	 flows.	 The	 limitation	 on	 expropriation	 is	 the	
residual	equity	ownership	by	entrepreneurs	that	enhances	their	interest	in	dividends	


















Laws,	 Industrial	 and	 Collective	 Relations,	 and	 Social	 Security.	 Employment	 laws	















laws,	with	some	 legislation	requiring	 lengthy	period	of	 time	notice	prior	 to	actual	
dismissal,	as	well	as	severance	packages.			
	
Industrial	 and	Collective	Relations	 laws	are	 specifically	 concerned	with	protecting	
workers	 from	their	employers.	 In	particular,	 this	 type	of	 law	governs	a	balance	of	
power	between	labour	unions	and	top	management.	There	are	three	sub-types	of	






unions.	 This	 phenomenon	 is	 referred	 to	 as	 a	 closed	 shop.	 Regarding	 worker	
participation	in	management,	the	body	of	regulation	is	focused	on	including	workers	
in	the	board	of	directors	of	a	company.	Finally,	regarding	laws	of	collective	disputes,	
these	 cover	 legal	 strikes,	 restrictions	 to	 strikes,	 employer	 defence	 options,	
compulsory	arbitration,	and	the	constitutional	cover	to	strikes.	
	
Social	 security	 laws	 are	 concerned	 with	 issues	 related	 specifically	 to	 old	 age,	
disability,	death,	sickness,	and	unemployment.	Botero,	et	al.	(2004	)	measure	these	
variables	based	on	the	generosity	of	pensions	vis-à-vis	the	worker’s	life	expectancy,	
the	age	of	 retirement,	 the	percentage	of	 the	monthly	 salary	 that	 is	 deducted	 for	














holds	 that	 there	are	 fixed	 costs	 to	 set	up	 institutions	at	 start,	 therefore	 it	 is	only	
rational	to	support	them	when	the	potential	benefits	surpass	costs.	The	efficiency	
theory	 can	 be	 specified	 further.	 First,	 one	 can	 consider	 the	 distinction	 between	
regulation	 and	 social	 insurance.	 That	 is,	 social	 insurance	 can	potentially	 deal	 in	 a	
more	efficient	way	with	market	failures	in	countries	with	lower	social	margin	costs	
of	tax	revenues.	This	means	that	poor	countries	must	regulate	to	protect	workers	







it	moves	 away	 from	 the	 perception	 of	 efficiency	maximization.	 According	 to	 this	












The	 third	 theory	 of	 institutional	 choice	 is	 the	 legal	 theory.	 This	 is	 based	 on	 the	
difference	between	legal	traditions	surfacing	from	differences	between	the	civil	and	
common	 law	 paradigms	 described	 previously.	 Specifically,	 the	 legal	 theory	 states	















true	 that	 labour	 laws	 in	 particular	 are	 shaped	 by	 the	 political	 power	 theory.	










its	demographic	 importance	and	 its	 ideological	 cohesion.	On	 the	other	hand,	 in	a	
majoritarian	 electoral	 system,	 it	 is	 the	 party	 that	 gathers	 the	 biggest	 number	 of	
districts	that	wind	a	specific	election.	The	authors	predict	that	investor	and	employee	












can	 shed	 light	 into	 the	 context	 of	 value	 creation	 across	 borders.	 In	 particular,	
consider	economic	reform.	The	rigidity	of	labour	markets	will	lead	to	a	reduction	in	






Economic	 reform	 tends	 to	 be	 either	 political	 or	 economic	 in	 its	 foundations.	
Specifically,	 it	 is	the	economic	argument	that	suggests	that	 labour	markets	should	
not	be	regulated,	and	thus	made	flexible.	Minimum	wages,	mandatory	benefits,	and	
other	special	benefits	increase	the	complexity	and	rigidity	of	labour	markets.	On	the	
other	 hand,	 the	 political	 argument	 suggests	 that	 labour	markets	 should	 be	more	
heavily	 regulated,	 and	 specifically	 the	 government	 should	 play	 a	 role	 in	 terms	 of	
compensating	 employees	 affected	 by	 economic	 reforms.	 The	 aim	 of	 these	









Mitchell	and	Strafford	 (2001)	 find	 that	over	a	 sample	of	7,376	M&A	observations	






























the	 larger	 the	event	window	must	be,	and	as	a	 consequence	 the	 less	precise	 the	
impact	of	that	specific	event	on	the	security’s	will	be	when	performing	hypothesis	




The	 second	 step	 of	 the	 event	 study	 methodology	 involves	 the	 specification	 and	
estimation	of	 a	 normal	 return	 generating	model.	 In	 this	 stage	of	 the	event	 study	
methodology,	the	larger	the	estimation	window,	the	more	robust	the	model	results	
will	 be.	 In	 the	 third	 stage,	 cumulative	 abnormal	 returns	must	 be	 computed.	 This	







these	 have	 typically	 ranged	 from	 a	 constant	mean	model	 without	 any	 underling	
theory	of	asset	pricing,	to	the	more	common	employment	of	a	market	model.	The	
common	 feature	 to	 every	model	 however	 is	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	 estimation	
period	is	fully	normal,	meaning,	no	outlier	events	have	been	announced	during	that	
period	 which	 can	 distort	 the	 true	 normal	 return	 generating	 process	 of	 a	 given	









The	market	model	 is	commonly	 implemented	in	the	context	of	event	studies.	 It	 is	
simple	 to	 implement,	 and	 has	 no	 underlying	 theory	 of	 asset	 pricing,	 such	 as	 the	
CAPM.	The	market	model	is	given	by	
	 R",$ = α" + β"R),$ + ε",$			 	 	 	 (1)	
	
where	R",$	is	the	return	of	firm	j	at	time	t,	R),$	is	the	market	return	at	time	t,	and	ε",$	
is	 the	residual	of	 firm	 j	at	time	t.	The	coefficients	α"	and	β"	are	estimated	by	OLS.	
With	this,	an	abnormal	return	is	defined	as	a	return	which	would	not	be	forecast	by	
equation	(1).	Specifically,	the	abnormal	return	of	each	stock	 i	at	moment	t	will	be	
equal	 to	ε",$.	It	 is	 important	 to	note	 that	 for	multiple	 statistical	 tests	 of	 abnormal	











the	 standardized	 abnormal	 returns	 as	 opposed	 to	 simply	 using	 the	 theoretical	
variance	(Aktas,	Bodta	and	Cousin	2007).		First,	the	test	requires	the	computation	of	
standardized	abnormal	returns	






t	 to	T,	3K,L	 is	 the	market	 index	 return	at	 the	event	date,	 and	3K	 is	 the	 average	
market	 return	during	 the	 estimation	period.	 Cumulative	 standardized	 returns	 are	
then	computed	as		
	 M234 = 	 234,55N5 		 	 	 	 	 (3)	
	
	The	BMP	test	is	then	computed	as		







Alternatively,	 the	 Beta-1	 test	 can	 also	 be	 used.	 The	 test	 has	 the	 disadvantage	 of	
assuming	 that	abnormal	 returns	are	normally	distributed.	On	the	other	hand,	 the	
test	does	not	use	data	from	the	estimation	window,	thus	reducing	the	potential	for	
bias	derived	 from	contamination.	We	note	however	 that	 this	bias	will	 already	be	
incorporated	in	the	estimation	of	abnormal	returns.	The	Beta-1	test	takes	the	form	
	
	OWXY − 1R = 	 >S T678S8H> 	>S(S@>)		 678N \C8SSVH> GS8H>9@9 																																										(5)	
	












(1986).	 Specifically,	 the	 model	 eliminates	 the	 unrealistic	 assumption	 of	 time-
invariant	 volatility	 of	 security	 returns.	 The	 practical	 application	 of	 time-varying	
volatility	in	the	context	of	event	studies	is	relatively	intuitive.	In	particular,	Savickas	
(2003)	 suggests	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 time-varying	 framework	 of	 Bollerslev	
(1986)	with	 an	 incremental	 dummy	 term	 to	 capture	 the	event	 induced	abnormal	
return.	The	author	suggests	implementing	the	return	generating	process	
	 34,] = 	 4^ + 	_43K,] +	 4`a4,] + 	b4,]	, 		b4,]	~d(0, fg)			 	 (7)	
	
where	34,]	is	the	return	of	firm	j	at	moment	t,	3K,]	is	the	return	of	the	market	index	
at	moment	t,	a4,]	is	a	dummy	variable	that	assumes	the	value	of	1	if	X ∈ −	1, 1 	and	
0	otherwise,	and	b4,]	is	an	error	term	which	is	assumed	to	be	normally	distributed.	
The	time-varying	variance	is	then	given	by		




(7),	which	takes	the	value	of	1	 if	X ∈ −	1, 1 	and	0	otherwise,	and	m4,]	 is	an	error	
term.	 The	 coefficients	 4^ , _4	, 4` 	 i4, j4, k4, and	l4 	 are	 estimated	 by	 maximum	
likelihood.	 Under	 this	 specification,	 Savickas	 (2003)	 argues	 that	 4` 	 captures	 the	
abnormal	 return	 at	 the	 announcement	 date	 and	f4,]g 	 provides	 an	 estimate	 of	 the	
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However,	 Aktas,	 Bodta	 and	 Cousin	 (2007)	 find	 that	 under	 a	 simulation	 of	
contamination	of	events,	the	GARCH	methodology	clearly	lags	in	terms	of	power	and	















	 34,] = 	 4^,< + _4,<3K,] + m4a4,] + b4,],<34,] = 	 4^,g + _4,g3K,] + m4a4,] + b4,],g 	 , b4,],n~d(0, f4,],ng )															(9)	
	




variance	 state,	 which	 is	 analogous	 to	 unexpected	 events	 during	 the	 estimation	




	 p<< 1 − pgg1 − p<< pgg 		 	 	 	 	 (10)	
	
where	pr,s = p S$ = m	 S$N< = n)	 is	 the	conditional	probability	of	changing	 from	
state	n	to	state	m.	Specifically,	note	that	the	transition	from	n	to	m	only	depends	on	
one	previous	state.	The	unconditional	probability	of	each	regime	is	given	by	




	 x2PPR = 	 >S T:78S8H> 	>S(S@>)		 :78N UC8SSVH> GS8H>9@9 			 	 					 					(12)	
	
where	the	standardized	abnormal	return	is	computed	as		











robustness	 when	 compared	 to	 the	 simple	 market	 model	 introduced	 by	 Sharpe	

































the	 increased	 volatility	 origintated	 by	 unrelated	 events	 which	 contaminate	 the	
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estimation	 period,	 and	S$=1	incorporates	 the	 return	 generating	 process	
information	corresponding	exclusively	to	the	market	normal	returns.	In	particular,	
the	 goal	 is	 to	 filter	 the	 contamination	 of	 unrelated	 events,	 and	 use	 only	 the	





Since	 we	 are	 interested	 in	 the	 low	 variance	 regime,	 and	 taking	 into	 account	 that	
σ",gg >	σ",<g	we	have	that		
	










takes	 into	 account	 the	probability	 of	 contamination	 of	 the	 estimation	 period.	A	
Smooth	Transition	Autoregressive	Model	(STAR)	can	be	presented	as		
	
34,]= 4^(<)+_4(<)3K,]âk],l	,ä	+ 4^(g)+_4(g)3K,] 1−âk],l	,ä	 + 4`a4,]	+	b4,](ã)		(20)	
	








that	 determines	 the	 speed	 at	 which	 the	 weights	 between	 the	 two	 states	 of	 the	
specification	 change.	 Note	 that	 is	 it	 is	 common	 to	 replace	 k]	 with	 a	 lagged	
endogenous	variable,	such	as	34,]N<.	
	
This	 model	 has	 several	 similarities	 with	 the	 two-state	 market	 model	 presented	








In	 what	 concerns	 the	 hypothesis	 of	 this	 work,	 we	 first	 clarify	 our	 approach.	
Specifically,	we	split	the	analysis	in	two	parts.	First,	we	explore	whether	the	findings	
of	Chari,	Ouimet	and	Tesar	(2010)	hold	under	an	updated	sample	which	spans	until	
2014	 and	 thus	 includes	 the	 complete	 6th	M&A	wave	 and	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 2008	
financial	crisis.	This	sample	also	includes	frontier	market	targets.	Furthermore,	we	
implement	a	2-state	market	model	to	compute	abnormal	returns.	In	particular,	we	




For	 the	 second	 part	 of	 this	 study,	we	 propose	 an	 alternative	 explanation	 for	 the	
generation	 of	 abnormal	 returns.	 In	 particular,	 we	 are	 interested	 in	 studying	 the	
influence	of	control	in	the	generation	of	abnormal	returns	for	acquiring	firms	when	
targets	are	based	in	either	emerging	or	frontier	markets.	But	we	also	want	to	find	
out	 if	 the	 difference	 in	 the	 legal	 environment	 between	 the	 acquiring	 and	 target	
nations	 specifically	 concerning	 labour	 plays	 any	 relevant	 role	 in	 explaining	 the	














of	 social	 security	 laws.	We	study:	 (a)	 if	any	of	 these	 types	of	 laws	are	 relevant	 in	
explaining	 abnormal	 returns	 at	 the	 acquiring	 level	 regardless	 of	 the	 target;	 (b)	 if	
these	 laws	 are	 relevant	 in	 explaining	 abnormal	 returns	 when	 acquisitions	 are	






managers	can	adjust	 the	use	of	 the	 labour	 force	 in	target	countries	within	a	 legal	







and	Pistre	 (2002).	The	authors	argue	that	 the	post-acquisition	 internal	 transfer	of	
resources	 can	 fall	 in	 three	 distinct	 categories:	 innovation	 resources,	 marketing	











generation	 of	 abnormal	 returns	 in	 cross	 border	 M&A	 deals,	 as	 well	 as	 several	









Collecting	data	 from	multiple	 sources	 is	 certainly	 a	 challenge.	Because	of	 this,	 an	
entire	section	is	dedicated	to	describing	and	explaining	how	data	was	collected.	We	














The	MSCI	 index	 considers	 three	 important	 criteria	when	evaluating	 each	nation’s	
market,	 which	 are	 related	 to	 Economic	 Development,	 Size	 &	 Liquidity,	 and	
Accessibility.		The	Economic	Development	criteria	is	only	used	to	classify	markets	as	
developed.	The	size	and	liquidity	requirements	are	based	on	minimum	investability	
thresholds.	 Finally,	 the	 Market	 Accessibility	 requirement	 aims	 to	 reflect	 the	
experience	of	institutional	investors	in	investing	in	a	given	market.	The	criteria	used	






market.	 Regarding	 Economic	Development,	 it	 is	mandatory	 for	 nations	 to	 have	 a	













Regarding	Market	Accessibility	 criteria,	 the	 country	must	 score	 at	 least	 as	 having	
significant	openness	to	foreign	ownership	and	ease	of	capital	flows,	good	and	tested	








having	 modest	 efficiency	 of	 their	 operational	 framework	 and	 stability	 of	 their	
institutional	framework.		
	









information	 specific	 to	M&A	 deals	 is	 obtained	 from	 Thomson	 One.	We	 create	 6	
different	 samples.	Specifically,	 these	 represent	deals	between	all	 combinations	of	
Developed	Market	(DM),	Emerging	Market	(EM)	and	Frontier	Market	(FM)	targets	
and	 Developed	 Market	 and	 Emerging	 Market	 acquirers.	 Each	 sample	 is	 initially	
composed	of	countries	derived	from	the	MSCI	specifications	detailed	previously.	We	
apply	several	restrictions	to	each	sample.	In	particular,	all	acquiring	firms	must	be	







illustrate	 this,	 consider	 sample	 1	 (DM-DM).	 From	 an	 initial	 set	 of	 768,526	 deals	
registered	 in	 the	 Thomson	 One	 database	 where	 the	 acquirer	 belongs	 to	 our	
developed	market	 list,	 only	 348,041	 deals	 involved	 a	 publicly	 traded	 acquirer.	Of	
those,	242,348	involved	a	public	or	privately	held	target	firm,	and	only	176,133	were	
announced	 between	 January	 1st	 1994	 and	 December	 31st	 2013.	 The	 sample	 is	
further	restricted	to	just	58,606	deals	with	a	transaction	value	of	more	than	USD	10	
million.	When	 considering	 targets	 exclusive	 to	 developed	markets,	 the	 sample	 is	
restricted	even	further	to	55,287	potential	deals.		
	












the	 target	 level	 of	 intangible	 assets,	 and	 the	 target	 number	 of	 employees.	 	 To	
illustrate	this,	if	we	were	to	include	those	variables,	there	would	be	no	deals	in	the	






















occur	 from	a	Nation	 that	 is	 represented	 in	 the	Labour	Law	 index	of	Botero,	et	al.	
(2004	).	This	last	restriction	does	not	lead	to	any	losses	in	our	sample,	since	the	index	











         
 
 




   
          
		 		 	 		 		 	 		 		 	 		 		 	 		 		 	 		 		 	




























		 		 		 		 		 		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Australia	 239	 	 Australia	 15	 	 Australia	 4	 	 Brazil	 16	 	 Brazil	 78	 	 Brazil	 0	 	
Austria	 12	 	 Austria	 5	 	 Austria	 10	 	 Chile	 3	 	 Chile	 14	 	 Chile	 0	 	
Belgium	 51	 	 Belgium	 7	 	 Belgium	 1	 	 China	 12	 	 China	 85	 	 China	 0	 	
Canada	 401	 	 Canada	 14	 	 Canada	 1	 	 Colombia	 0	 	 Colombia	 3	 	 Colombia	 0	 	
Denmark	 30	 	 Denmark	 2	 	 Denmark	 1	 	 Czech	Republic	 0	 	 Czech	Republic	 4	 	 Czech	Republic	 2	 	
Finland	 54	 	 Finland	 10	 	 Finland	 1	 	 Egypt	 0	 	 Egypt	 0	 	 Egypt	 0	 	
France	 193	 	 France	 40	 	 France	 2	 	 Hungary	 1	 	 Hungary	 1	 	 Hungary	 1	 	
Germany	 162	 	 Germany	 21	 	 Germany	 0	 	 India	 46	 	 India	 60	 	 India	 1	 	
Hong	Kong	 20	 	 Hong	Kong	 22	 	 Hong	Kong	 1	 	 Indonesia	 0	 	 Indonesia	 0	 	 Indonesia	 0	 	
Ireland-Rep	 59	 	 Ireland-Rep	 2	 	 Ireland-Rep	 2	 	 Malaysia	 1	 	 Malaysia	 2	 	 Malaysia	 0	 	
Italy	 161	 	 Italy	 25	 	 Italy	 5	 	 Mexico	 6	 	 Mexico	 14	 	 Mexico	 0	 	
Japan	 566	 	 Japan	 44	 	 Japan	 1	 	 Peru	 0	 	 Peru	 0	 	 Peru	 0	 	
Netherlands	 100	 	 Netherlands	 15	 	 Netherlands	 4	 	 Philippines	 0	 	 Philippines	 3	 	 Philippines	 0	 	
New	Zealand	 3	 	 New	Zealand	 0	 	 New	Zealand	 0	 	 Poland	 3	 	 Poland	 34	 	 Poland	 3	 	
Norway	 89	 	 Norway	 4	 	 Norway	 0	 	 Russian	Fed	 3	 	 Russian	Fed	 28	 	 Russian	Fed	 0	 	
Portugal	 6	 	 Portugal	 1	 	 Portugal	 0	 	 South	Africa	 18	 	 South	Africa	 32	 	 South	Africa	 5	 	
Spain	 142	 	 Spain	 25	 	 Spain	 1	 	 South	Korea	 29	 	 South	Korea	 403	 	 South	Korea	 6	 	
Sweden	 107	 	 Sweden	 15	 	 Sweden	 2	 	 Taiwan	 12	 	 Taiwan	 105	 	 Taiwan	 0	 	
Switzerland	 108	 	 Switzerland	 21	 	 Switzerland	 0	 	 Thailand	 0	 	 Thailand	 2	 	 Thailand	 0	 	
United	Kingdom	 810	 	 United	Kingdom	 95	 	 United	Kingdom	 8	 	 Turkey	 0	 	 Turkey	 20	 	 Turkey	 0	 	
United	States	 5,565	 	 United	States	 186	 	 United	States	 8	 	 Total	 150	 	 Total	 888	 	 Total	 18	 	
Total	 8,878	 	 Total	 569	 	 Total	 52	 	          





	 	               
Panel	B:	Target	Nations	 	               
		 		 	 		 		 	 		 		 	 		 		 	 		 		 	 		 		 	






























		 		 		 		 		 		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Australia	 296	 	 Brazil	 78	 	 Bulgaria	 4	 	 Australia	 22	 	 Brazil	 78	 	 Bulgaria	 1	 	
Austria	 19	 	 Chile	 17	 	 Croatia	 3	 	 Austria	 1	 	 Chile	 7	 	 Croatia	 1	 	
Belgium	 44	 	 China	 114	 	 Ghana	 1	 	 Belgium	 2	 	 China	 103	 	 Ghana	 3	 	
Canada	 501	 	 Colombia	 9	 	 Jamaica	 4	 	 Canada	 12	 	 Colombia	 7	 	 Jamaica	 0	 	
Denmark	 41	 	 Czech	Republic	 10	 	 Kazakhstan	 1	 	 Denmark	 1	 	 Czech	Republic	 4	 	 Kazakhstan	 1	 	
Finland	 38	 	 Egypt	 7	 	 Kenya	 0	 	 Finland	 1	 	 Egypt	 0	 	 Kenya	 0	 	
France	 213	 	 Hungary	 8	 	 Lebanon	 0	 	 France	 3	 	 Hungary	 4	 	 Lebanon	 1	 	
Germany	 236	 	 India	 64	 	 Lithuania	 2	 	 Germany	 5	 	 India	 52	 	 Lithuania	 2	 	
Hong	Kong	 36	 	 Indonesia	 12	 	 Nigeria	 2	 	 Hong	Kong	 5	 	 Indonesia	 6	 	 Nigeria	 1	 	
Ireland-Rep	 53	 	 Malaysia	 6	 	 Pakistan	 1	 	 Ireland-Rep	 1	 	 Malaysia	 5	 	 Pakistan	 1	 	
Italy	 151	 	 Mexico	 22	 	 Romania	 11	 	 Italy	 2	 	 Mexico	 13	 	 Romania	 2	 	
Japan	 528	 	 Peru	 9	 	 Slovenia	 2	 	 Japan	 5	 	 Peru	 4	 	 Slovenia	 0	 	
Netherlands	 91	 	 Philippines	 5	 	 Sri	Lanka	 2	 	 Netherlands	 4	 	 Philippines	 4	 	 Sri	Lanka	 0	 	
New	Zealand	 25	 	 Poland	 24	 	 Tunisia	 1	 	 New	Zealand	 2	 	 Poland	 30	 	 Tunisia	 0	 	
Norway	 97	 	 Russian	Fed	 48	 	 Ukraine 9  Norway	 2	 	 Russian	Fed	 32	 	 Ukraine 0  
Portugal	 16	 	 South	Africa	 24	 	 Vietnam 9  Portugal	 1	 	 South	Africa	 29	 	 Vietnam 5  
Spain	 130	 	 South	Korea	 41	 	 Total 52  Spain	 3	 	 South	Korea	 379	 	 Total 18  
Sweden	 97	 	 Taiwan	 28	 	    Sweden	 1	 	 Taiwan	 99	 	    
Switzerland	 75	 	 Thailand	 9	 	    Switzerland	 4	 	 Thailand	 9	 	    
United	Kingdom	 748	 	 Turkey	 34	 	    United	Kingdom	 13	 	 Turkey	 23	 	    
United	States	 5,443	 	 Total	 569	 	    United	States	 60	 	 Total	 888	 	    
Total	 8,878	 	       Total	 150	 	       




Table	 (1)	provides	a	 first	overview	of	 the	complete	 samples	used	 throughout	 this	
study.	In	particular,	we	create	six	sub-samples	with	all	combinations	of	Developed,	
Emerging,	 and	Frontier	Markets	 at	 the	 target	 level,	 and	Developed	and	Emerging	
Markets	 at	 the	 acquiring	 level.	 It	 is	 relevant	 to	 point	 out	 that	 over	 60%	 of	 all	













but	 also	 reveals	 one	of	 the	 strongest	weaknesses	 of	 the	 data.	 Although	 the	 data	






sub-sample.	 First,	 notice	 that	 when	 the	 acquiring	 firm	 is	 headquartered	 in	 a	
developed	market,	the	average	transaction	size	is	largest	when	the	target	is	from	a	
developed	economy,	and	smallest	when	it	 is	from	a	frontier	economy.	In	fact,	the	
average	 transaction	 size	 is	 over	 twice	 as	 large	 when	 the	 target	 is	 based	 on	 a	
developed	economy	rather	than	on	a	frontier	one.		
	











	  Sample	1	(DM-DM)	 		 Sample	2	(DM-EM)	 		 Sample	3	(DM-FM)	 		 Sample	4	(EM-DM)	 		 Sample	5	(EM-EM)	 		 Sample	6	(EM-FM)	
	 	 		 	 		 	 		 	 		 	 		 	
Firm	and	Deal	Characteristics	 	                 
                   
Number	of	Deals	 8,878	 	 569	 	 52	 	 150	 	 888	 	 18	
Average	Transaction	Size	 531.9	 	 306.6	 	 220.0	 	 371.1	 	 239.9	 	 472.6	
Average	Acquirer	Market	Capitalization	 56,227.6	 	 24,992.6	 	 23,201.7	 	 9,622.7	 	 19,626.8	 	 5,967.9	
Control	Acquired	(%)	 90.8%	 	 66.4%	 	 69.2%	 	 70.0%	 	 61.0%	 	 77.8%	
Public	Target	(%)	 33.1%	 	 34.4%	 	 35.3%	 	 37.3%	 	 43.4%	 	 50.0%	
Diversifying	Acquisition	(%)	 68.6%	 	 63.3%	 	 46.2%	 	 69.3%	 	 74.8%	 	 61.1%	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Target	Industry	 	                 
              
Agriculture,	Forestry	and	Fishing	 64	 	 4	 	 1	 	 2	 	 5	 	 0	
Mining	 448	 	 28	 	 7	 	 25	 	 19	 	 2	
Construction	 160	 	 2	 	 0	 	 0	 	 35	 	 3	
Manufacturing	 2,714	 	 241	 	 11	 	 60	 	 384	 	 6	
Transport,	Communication	and	Utilities	 608	 	 46	 	 4	 	 4	 	 114	 	 2	
Wholesale	Trade	 287	 	 18	 	 1	 	 6	 	 23	 	 1	
Retail	Trade	 285	 	 20	 	 1	 	 2	 	 28	 	 0	
Finance,	Insurance	and	Real	Estate	 1,480	 	 96	 	 23	 	 12	 	 139	 	 3	
Services	 2,822	 	 114	 	 4	 	 39	 	 141	 	 1	
Public	Administration	 10	 	 0	 	 0	 	 0	 	 0	 	 0	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Acquirer	Industry	 	                 
             
Agriculture,	Forestry	and	Fishing	 38	 	 3	 	 0	 	 3	 	 0	 	 0	
Mining	 432	 	 31	 	 6	 	 18	 	 33	 	 3	
Construction	 152	 	 2	 	 0	 	 4	 	 26	 	 3	
Manufacturing	 3,271	 	 258	 	 15	 	 75	 	 447	 	 7	
Transport,	Communication	and	Utilities	 597	 	 52	 	 4	 	 6	 	 123	 	 1	
Wholesale	Trade	 264	 	 7	 	 1	 	 5	 	 22	 	 1	
Retail	Trade	 266	 	 14	 	 0	 	 1	 	 32	 	 0	
Finance,	Insurance	and	Real	Estate	 1,712	 	 110	 	 24	 	 7	 	 108	 	 2	
Services	 2,139	 	 92	 	 2	 	 31	 	 97	 	 1	
Public	Administration	 7	 	 0	 	 0	 	 0	 	 0	 	 0	















Consistent	 with	 the	 results	 of	 Chari,	 Ouimet	 and	 Tesar	 (2010),	 we	 also	 find	 that	
approximately	 45%	 to	75%	of	 acquisitions	 involve	diversification	efforts.	 It	 is	 also	
clear	that	there	is	a	strong	cross-sectional	variance	in	terms	of	industries,	both	at	the	
acquirer	 and	 target	 levels.	Nevertheless,	 still	 over	one	 third	of	 developed	market	
transactions	 involving	 developed	market	 targets	 originated	 from	 acquirers	 in	 the	
manufacturing	 industry,	 nearly	 25%	 were	 focused	 on	 the	 services	 industry,	 and	
nearly	20%	were	focused	on	the	financial,	insurance	and	real	estate	industries.	The	
same	 can	 be	 said	 of	 acquisitions	 where	 the	 target	 is	 based	 in	 an	 emerging	 and	
frontier	markets.	Notice	however	that	close	to	half	of	all	developed	market	acquirers	




























	   
Objective	Ownership	
	  
 Yes	 No	 	 <20%	 20%-40%	 40%-50%	 	 		 Yes	 No	 	 <20%	 20%-40%	 40%-50%	
Sample	1	(DM-DM)	 		 	       Sample	4	(EM-DM)	 	       
0%-50%	 	 196	 618	 	 129	 62	 5	 	 0%-50%	 	 7	 38	 	 4	 3	 0	
50%-95%	 	 129	 325	 	 30	 60	 39	 	 50%-95%	 	 6	 28	 	 3	 2	 1	
95%-100%	 	 328	 7,282	 	 144	 120	 64	 	 95%-100%	 	 1	 70	 	 1	 0	 0	
Total	 	 653	 8,225	 	 303	 242	 108	 	 Total	 	 14	 136	 	 8	 5	 1	
	         		 		 	 	 	 	 	 	
Sample	2	(DM-EM)	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Sample	5	(EM-EM)	 	       
0%-50%	 	 32	 159	 	 23	 6	 3	 	 0%-50%	 	 71	 275	 	 41	 25	 5	
50%-95%	 	 21	 121	 	 4	 12	 5	 	 50%-95%	 	 52	 160	 	 12	 21	 19	
95%-100%	 	 19	 217	 	 1	 6	 12	 	 95%-100%	 	 50	 280	 	 17	 19	 14	
Total	 	 72	 497	 	 28	 24	 20	 	 Total	 	 173	 715	 	 70	 65	 38	
		 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 		 	 	 	 	 	 	
Sample	3	(DM-FM)	 	        Sample	6	(EM-FM)	 	       
0%-50%	 	 1	 15	 	 1	 0	 0	 	 0%-50%	 	 0	 4	 	 0	 0	 0	
50%-95%	 	 4	 15	 	 1	 2	 1	 	 50%-95%	 	 0	 9	 	 0	 0	 0	
95%-100%	 	 1	 16	 	 0	 1	 0	 	 95%-100%	 	 0	 5	 	 0	 0	 0	
Total	 	 6	 46	 	 2	 3	 1	 	 Total	 	 0	 18	 	 0	 0	 0	









et	al.	 (2004).	The	authors	build	a	data	set	which	describes	 the	 legal	protection	of	
labour	 forces	 in	 85	 countries.	 The	 index	 is	 the	most	updated	 and	 comprehensive	
study	of	this	type	of	laws	as	far	as	we	are	aware.	Nevertheless,	it	uses	information	
dating	 back	 to	 1997.	 In	 order	 to	 construct	 each	 variable,	 the	 authors	 source	
information	from	a	variety	of	studies	and	databases.	Each	law	is	assigned	a	score,	
which	 is	 higher	 if	 it	 provides	 more	 protection	 benefits	 to	 workers.	 The	 authors	
assume	a	standardized	worker	to	simulate	their	approach.	The	index	presents	three	
important	variables:	Employment	Laws,	Collective	Relations	Laws,	and	Social	Security	
Laws.	We	 provide	 a	 detailed	 theoretical	 description	 of	 each	 type	 in	 section	 II.X.	
However,	 we	 make	 a	 detailed	 explanation	 of	 how	 each	 index	 is	 empirically	




The	 employment	 law	 index	 is	 one	 of	 three	 key	 indices	 and	 is	 concerned	 with	
measuring	the	level	of	protection	that	employment	laws	convey	to	workers.	This	is	
built	 as	 the	 average	 of	 an	 alternative	 employment	 contract	 index,	 the	 cost	 of	
increasing	 the	 number	 of	 hours	 worked	 by	 an	 employee,	 the	 cost	 of	 firing	 an	
employee,	and	the	complexity	of	the	dismissal	process.	In	what	concerns	alternative	
employment	contracts,	 the	variable	measures	the	cost	of	alternatives	to	standard	
employment	 contracts,	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 benefits	 enjoyed	 by	 part	 time	




authors	 measure	 the	 equivalent	 cost	 of	 firing	 20%	 of	 the	 workforce	 of	 a	 given	
company,	with	the	total	cost	being	equal	to	the	sum	of	a	severance	pay,	a	notice	
	 44	
period,	 and	 all	 the	 remaining	 mandatory	 penalties	 predicted	 in	 each	 specific	










parties,	 the	 authorization	 of	 closed	 shops,	 the	 right	 for	 unions	 and	 workers	 to	
appoint	members	of	the	board	of	directors,	and	the	possibility	to	mandate	worker’s	
councils.	 The	 second	 component	 of	 the	 index	 concerns	 collective	 disputes	









this	 index	 is	 concerned	 with	 the	 benefits	 allocated	 to	 workers	 in	 exceptional	
circumstances	 such	as	 illness,	 and	 in	 terminal	 circumstances	 such	as	old	age.	The	
index	has	three	components.	The	first	is	concerned	with	old	age,	disability	and	death.	
This	 component	 measures	 the	 level	 of	 benefits	 allocated	 to	 workers	 in	 such	
circumstances	given	the	difference	between	retirement	age	and	life	expectancy	at	
birth,	the	amount	of	time	required	by	a	worker	to	contribute	with	in	order	to	benefit	
from	 a	 normalised	 retirement	 package,	 the	 relative	 amount	 of	 a	 month’s	 salary	
required	for	deductions	to	contribute	to	old-age	pension	funds,	and	the	percentage	
of	 pre-retirement	 salary	 which	 is	 covered	 by	 old-age	 pensions.	 The	 second	
	 45	
component	of	the	index	is	related	to	sickness	benefits.	This	component	measures	the	
benefits	allocated	to	workers	 in	case	of	 illness	and	 is	measured	by	the	number	of	




component	 of	 the	 index	 refers	 to	 unemployment	 benefits.	 This	 component	 is	
constructed	given	the	average	number	of	month	equivalent	contributions	required	
to	 qualify	 for	 unemployment	 benefits,	 the	 relative	 amount	 of	 a	 month’s	 salary	
equivalent	which	is	deducted	in	order	to	cover	for	unemployment	benefits,	the	total	





We	 implement	 two	 separate	 methodologies	 to	 compute	 cumulative	 abnormal	
returns.	For	the	first,	we	follow	Chari,	Ouimet	and	Tesar	(2010)	and	employ	a	simple	
market	model	to	generate	expected	and	abnormal	returns.	However,	we	implement	






impact	 on	 the	 robustness	 of	 our	 time-series.	 However,	 trading	 effects,	 with	 a	
particular	emphasis	on	emerging	market	acquirers,	should	be	taken	into	account.	We	
implement	equation	(1),	computing	the	coefficients	as		





the	average	return	of	security	j	during	the	estimation	period	9 ∈ −180,−30 ,	and	05,2	 	is	the	average	return	of	the	adequate	market	index	during	the	same	estimation	
period.	After	obtaining	the	abnormal	returns	for	each	security,	we	then	run	equation	
(6)	 to	 compute	CAR’s,	 using	? = 1	 and	? = 2,	 that	 is,	 a	 3-day	 and	 a	 5-day	 event	
windows.	 We	 also	 compute	 standardized	 abnormal	 returns	 and	 standardized	
cumulative	abnormal	returns,	using	equations	 (2)	and	(3)	 respectively,	 in	order	to	






We	 use	 Stata	 to	 compute	 a	 2-state	market	model	 for	 each	 transaction	 in	 all	 six	
samples.	In	particular,	we	are	interested	in	obtaining	the	A" 	coefficient,	which	is	not	
state	dependent	 and	 captures	 the	 abnormal	 return	of	 each	day	during	 the	event	
window.	We	also	choose	to	compare	the	results	of	? = 1	and	? = 2.	The	model	is	














transaction,	 the	 market	 capitalization	 of	 the	 acquirer,	 and	 the	 leverage	 of	 the	
	 47	





In	 particular,	 the	 inclusion	 of	 fixed	 effects	 attempts	 to	 solve	 the	 concern	 of	 an	
omitted	variable	bias,	which	 can	 lead	 to	unobserved	heterogeneity.	 For	example,	
when	 considering	 fixed	 effects	 at	 the	 target	 nation	 level,	 we	 are	 interested	 in	
understanding	the	variability	derived	from	the	set	of	firms	belonging	to	a	particular	





































is	 seems	 clear	 that	 acquirers	 based	 in	 developed	 markets	 targeting	 developed	
market	 firms	 experience	 positive	 and	 statistically	 significant	 CAR’s,	 regardless	 of	









errors,	 which	 can	 result	 in	 excessive	 acceptance	 of	 the	 null	 hypothesis	 of	 no	
abnormal	 returns.	 In	 this	 particular	 case	 however,	 it	 seems	 we	 are	 seeing	 the	
opposite.	We	 suggest	 that	 a	 potential	 explanation	 for	 this	 effect	 is	 that	 a	 simple	
market	model	will	not	only	overestimate	the	size	of	the	standard	errors,	but	it	will	



















	        
	        
	        
Panel	A:	Market	Model	 	       
 Full	Sample	 	 Control	
	 3	Days	 	 5	Days	 	 3	Days	 	 5	Days	
	        
Sample	1	(DM-DM)	 0.26%***⁺⁺⁺	 	 0.28%***⁺⁺⁺	 	 0.26%***⁺⁺⁺	 	 0.31%***⁺⁺⁺	
	        
Sample	2	(DM-EM)	 0.50%**⁺	 	 0.45%*⁺	 	 0.83%**⁺⁺	 	 0.77%**⁺⁺	
	        
Sample	3	(DM-FM)	 -0.07%	 	 0.21%	 	 -1.05%	 	 -0.51%	
	        
Sample	4	(EM-DM)	 0.60%	 	 0.82%	 	 0.72%	 	 0.66%	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Sample	5	(EM-EM)	 1.46%***⁺⁺⁺	 	 1.13%***⁺⁺⁺	 	 1.92%***⁺⁺⁺	 	 1.90%***⁺⁺⁺	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Sample	6	(EM-FM)	 1.27%	 	 1.85%*⁺	 	 1.70%	 	 2.47%**⁺⁺	
	        
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
	 	       
Panel	B:	2-State	Markov	Model	       
 Full	Sample	 	 Control	
	 3	Days	 	 5	Days	 	 3	Days	 	 5	Days	
	        
Sample	1	(DM-DM)	 0.20%	 	 0.28%*	 	 0.19%	 	 0.30%*	
	        
Sample	2	(DM-EM)	 0.59%***	 	 0.59%	 	 1.06%***	 	 0.99%***	
	        
Sample	3	(DM-FM)	 0.04%	 	 0.46%	 	 -0.01%	 	 1.07%	
	        
Sample	4	(EM-DM)	 0.19%	 	 0.40%	 	 0.64%	 	 0.39%	
	        
Sample	5	(EM-EM)	 1.38%**	 	 0.59%	 	 1.84%***	 	 1.49%***	
	        
Sample	6	(EM-FM)	 0.34%	 	 0.86%	 	 1.16%*	 	 1.15%	
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developed	 market	 acquirers	 do	 not	 experience	 any	 statistically	 significant	 CAR’s	
when	 acquiring	 firms	 in	 frontier	 markets.	 This	 result	 strongly	 contrasts	 with	 the	
acquisition	of	firms	in	emerging	markets.	In	the	latter	case,	when	analysing	a	3-day	
event	 window	 the	 results	 suggest	 that	 acquiring	 firms	 experience	 statistically	
significant	and	positive	CAR’s.	In	particular,	the	results	of	Panel	B	suggest	that	in	a	3-
day	 event	 window,	 acquiring	 firms	 experience	 a	 statistically	 significant	 abnormal	




positive	 and	 statistically	 significant	 CAR’s,	 regardless	 of	 the	 method	 chosen	 to	






the	 specification	 implemented,	 emerging	 market	 acquirers	 do	 not	 seem	 to	
experience	statistically	significant	CAR’s	when	acquiring	firms	in	developed	markets.	
















day	 event	 window.	 The	 choice	 of	 the	 Markov	 model	 is	 based	 on	 our	 previous	









to	 note	 the	 considerably	 larger	 standard	 deviation	 of	 the	 distribution	 of	 acquirer	
market	capitalizations	in	the	same	sample.	Specifically,	this	value	is	particularly	high	




Another	 striking	 observation	 comes	 from	 the	 comparison	 of	 transaction	 sizes	
between	 samples.	 In	 particular,	 notice	 that	 although	 samples	 2,	 3,	 4	 and	 5	 have	
relatively	similar	transaction	sizes,	samples	1	and	6	stand	out	for	having	transactions	













	 	             
Panel	A:	Control	Acquired	 	             



























	     
     
Sample	1	(DM-DM)	 	      Sample	4	(EM-DM)	 	     
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Mean	 	 0.19%	 44,084.8	 -859.3	 557.4	 -2.3	 	 Mean	 	 0.64%	 9,158.0	 34.9	 484.7	 2.8	
Median	 	 0.24%	 1,502.0	 1.7	 66.7	 0.0	 	 Median	 	 0.37%	 2,182.9	 5.1	 50.0	 0.1	
Top	Quartile	 	 2.50%	 5,408.1	 36.0	 222.6	 0.5	 	 Top	Quartile	 	 3.09%	 10,519.0	 75.7	 150.0	 1.2	
Bottom	Quartile	 -2.00%	 511.5	 -30.5	 27.0	 -0.3	 	 Bottom	Quartile	 -1.91%	 559.7	 -44.9	 29.0	 -0.5	
Standard	Deviation	 6.20%	 2,047,641.6	 52,665.8	 3,326.6	 214.6	 	 Standard	Deviation	 4.81%	 21,928.5	 379.6	 2,178.8	 13.7	
		 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Sample	2	(DM-EM)	 	      Sample	5	(EM-EM)	 	     
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Mean	 	 1.06%	 17,091.8	 78.0	 294.8	 1.4	 	 Mean	 	 1.84%	 27,728.0	 354.5	 300.4	 13.3	
Median	 	 0.63%	 3,506.8	 9.6	 56.0	 0.1	 	 Median	 	 0.94%	 839.7	 3.5	 42.5	 0.1	
Top	Quartile	 	 2.47%	 16,361.6	 88.1	 213.8	 1.2	 	 Top	Quartile	 	 4.43%	 3,401.1	 31.7	 137.9	 0.5	
Bottom	Quartile	 -1.01%	 1,124.3	 -32.6	 23.6	 -0.5	 	 Bottom	Quartile	 -1.55%	 206.0	 -10.5	 19.2	 -0.3	
Standard	Deviation	 6.58%	 32,149.1	 742.5	 641.0	 12.5	 	 Standard	Deviation	 7.48%	 386,508.4	 8,621.0	 1,645.4	 319.2	
		 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Sample	3	(DM-FM)	 	      Sample	6	(EM-FM)	 	     
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Mean	 	 -0.01%	 15,702.9	 -197.9	 250.3	 -2.9	 	 Mean	 	 1.16%	 6,690.0	 60.1	 573.2	 0.1	
Median	 	 0.18%	 4,415.8	 4.4	 46.5	 0.1	 	 Median	 	 0.34%	 3,125.1	 18.6	 62.1	 0.0	
Top	Quartile	 	 1.70%	 23,535.8	 73.5	 112.4	 1.4	 	 Top	Quartile	 	 2.99%	 6,264.8	 63.4	 164.2	 0.4	
Bottom	Quartile	 -1.46%	 2,119.1	 -132.4	 22.7	 -1.0	 	 Bottom	Quartile	 -0.49%	 1,169.9	 -7.0	 32.5	 -0.3	
Standard	Deviation	 2.61%	 20,615.3	 711.9	 790.2	 15.5	 	 Standard	Deviation	 4.14%	 8,720.8	 177.0	 1,469.7	 1.1	
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Panel	B:	Control	Not	Acquired	 	            
               



























	     
     
Sample	1	(DM-DM)	 	      Sample	4	(EM-DM)	 	     
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Mean	 	 0.29%	 176,522.1	 -1,026.9	 279.5	 -0.7	 	 Mean	 	 -0.86%	 10,707.2	 -131.8	 106.0	 -0.4	
Median	 	 -0.01%	 5,756.9	 -0.4	 52.4	 0.0	 	 Median	 	 -0.63%	 2,095.6	 -4.8	 29.8	 -0.1	
Top	Quartile	 	 1.91%	 19,649.5	 94.3	 167.5	 1.1	 	 Top	Quartile	 	 2.49%	 6,712.6	 24.7	 65.2	 0.5	
Bottom	Quartile	 -1.60%	 1,752.0	 -90.3	 21.4	 -1.3	 	 Bottom	Quartile	 -2.60%	 576.3	 -70.8	 15.3	 -2.9	
Standard	Deviation	 4.93%	 4,205,325.9	 21,077.3	 785.9	 39.5	 	 Standard	Deviation	 6.88%	 27,343.7	 1,104.7	 227.1	 17.5	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Sample	2	(DM-EM)	 	      Sample	5	(EM-EM)	 	     
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Mean	 	 -0.34%	 40,628.8	 -332.5	 330.0	 -13.4	 	 Mean	 	 0.67%	 6,936.4	 30.1	 145.2	 0.8	
Median	 	 0.16%	 16,766.3	 7.5	 75.0	 0.1	 	 Median	 	 0.40%	 1,154.3	 1.2	 35.5	 0.0	
Top	Quartile	 	 1.82%	 54,108.6	 216.5	 229.1	 2.2	 	 Top	Quartile	 	 3.02%	 6,138.1	 45.8	 98.8	 0.7	
Bottom	Quartile	 -1.49%	 4,763.3	 -303.2	 29.0	 -1.7	 	 Bottom	Quartile	 -1.86%	 271.4	 -21.4	 18.7	 -0.4	
Standard	Deviation	 5.21%	 58,817.0	 2,504.6	 855.1	 174.8	 	 Standard	Deviation	 6.42%	 17,092.5	 357.3	 369.1	 11.2	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Sample	3	(DM-FM)	 	      Sample	6	(EM-FM)	 	     
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Mean	 	 0.14%	 40,074.1	 163.3	 152.0	 -2.3	 	 Mean	 	 -2.53%	 3,440.6	 -89.7	 120.2	 -1.8	
Median	 	 0.58%	 15,508.4	 36.6	 72.4	 0.2	 	 Median	 	 -3.49%	 1,273.2	 -63.6	 30.3	 -0.4	
Top	Quartile	 	 1.19%	 41,763.3	 112.5	 162.9	 2.7	 	 Top	Quartile	 	 0.01%	 4,627.7	 -4.5	 123.4	 -0.2	
Bottom	Quartile	 -0.21%	 5,416.5	 -16.9	 25.3	 -0.2	 	 Bottom	Quartile	 -6.03%	 86.0	 -148.8	 27.1	 -2.0	
Standard	Deviation	 1.92%	 60,852.4	 637.2	 210.8	 15.8	 	 Standard	Deviation	 6.71%	 5,249.2	 113.2	 187.8	 3.1	









	 	             
Panel	C:	Full	Sample	 	             
               



























	     
     
Sample	1	(DM-DM)	 	      Sample	4	(EM-DM)	 	     
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Mean	 	 0.20%	 56,227.6	 -874.6	 531.9	 -2.2	 	 Mean	 	 0.19%	 9,622.7	 -15.1	 371.1	 1.8	
Median	 	 0.21%	 1,682.8	 1.6	 65.5	 0.0	 	 Median	 	 -0.09%	 2,139.3	 -0.3	 44.2	 0.0	
Top	Quartile	 	 2.42%	 6,397.4	 38.9	 213.8	 0.5	 	 Top	Quartile	 	 2.94%	 9,889.8	 44.0	 106.1	 0.9	
Bottom	Quartile	 -1.96%	 551.8	 -32.6	 26.3	 -0.4	 	 Bottom	Quartile	 -2.08%	 559.7	 -57.0	 20.0	 -0.8	
Standard	Deviation	 6.09%	 2,330,125.1	 50,596.8	 3,180.3	 204.9	 	 Standard	Deviation	 5.53%	 23,599.4	 683.3	 1,832.7	 15.0	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Sample	2	(DM-EM)	 	      Sample	5	(EM-EM)	 	     
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Mean	 	 0.59%	 24,992.6	 -59.8	 306.6	 -3.6	 	 Mean	 	 1.38%	 19,626.8	 228.1	 239.9	 8.4	
Median	 	 0.46%	 6,130.3	 9.2	 62.2	 0.1	 	 Median	 	 0.62%	 920.4	 2.2	 39.3	 0.0	
Top	Quartile	 	 2.18%	 29,993.6	 120.3	 223.1	 1.5	 	 Top	Quartile	 	 3.88%	 4,322.5	 37.0	 122.2	 0.6	
Bottom	Quartile	 -1.23%	 1,474.3	 -66.2	 24.8	 -0.7	 	 Bottom	Quartile	 -1.68%	 230.0	 -13.8	 18.8	 -0.3	
Standard	Deviation	 6.19%	 44,350.6	 1,581.8	 719.4	 101.9	 	 Standard	Deviation	 7.10%	 302,211.7	 6,738.3	 1,307.7	 249.5	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Sample	3	(DM-FM)	 	      Sample	6	(EM-FM)	 	     
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Mean	 	 0.04%	 23,201.7	 -86.8	 220.0	 -2.7	 	 Mean	 	 0.34%	 5,967.9	 26.8	 472.6	 -0.3	
Median	 	 0.29%	 7,441.6	 14.3	 54.2	 0.1	 	 Median	 	 0.09%	 2,049.2	 1.6	 47.0	 0.0	
Top	Quartile	 	 1.36%	 29,801.9	 91.4	 117.7	 1.6	 	 Top	Quartile	 	 2.99%	 6,264.8	 23.5	 164.2	 0.3	
Bottom	Quartile	 -0.99%	 2,357.1	 -54.1	 22.7	 -0.9	 	 Bottom	Quartile	 -1.84%	 701.2	 -8.5	 30.2	 -0.4	
Standard	Deviation	 2.40%	 38,855.9	 704.0	 666.1	 15.4	 	 Standard	Deviation	 4.85%	 8,059.3	 174.2	 1,302.1	 1.8	






from	 the	 comparison	 between	 CAR’s	 and	 actual	 dollar	 value	 gains	 between	










































	 DM-All DM-All EM-All EM-All  All-DM All-DM All-EM All-EM All-FM All-FM 
		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	 (9)	 (10)	
	            
Control	 -0.598***	 -0.35*	 1.487	 0.605	 	 0.778	 1.126	 3.228*	 3.52*	 6.328*	 8.337**	
	 (0.202)	 (0.241)	 (1.200)	 (1.027)	 	 (1.642)	 (1.650)	 (1.877)	 (1.860)	 (3.765)	 (3.432)	
EM	Target		 -0.767*	 -0.251	 1.77*	 -0.272	 	       
 (0.422)	 (0.575)	 (1.017)	 (1.194)	 	       
FM	Target	 -0.433	 -1.222	 -1.699	 -2.976**	 	       
 (0.539)	 (1.366)	 (1.317)	 (1.181)	 	       
EM	Target	*	Control	 1.545***	 0.842**	 -0.346	 0.893	 	       
 (0.550)	 (0.386)	 (1.261)	 (1.290)	 	       
FM	Target	*	Control	 0.15	 1.515	 2.139	 3.746***	 	       
 (0.704)	 (1.557)	 (1.744)	 (1.318)	 	       
DM	Acquirer	 	     1.458	 1.425	 -0.588	 -0.366	 3.201**	 3.459**	
	      (1.077)	 (1.100)	 (0.568)	 (0.557)	 (1.380)	 (1.677)	
DM	Acquirer	*	Control	 	     -1.909	 -1.781	 0.543	 0.459	 -4.099**	 -4.915**	
	      (1.169)	 (1.186)	 (0.826)	 (0.827)	 (1.670)	 (2.332)	
Public	 -1.15***	 -0.865***	 0.097	 0.094	 	 -0.971***	 -0.985***	 -0.027	 0.116	 0.612	 0.822	
	 (0.147)	 (0.216)	 (0.453)	 (0.803)	 	 (0.156)	 (0.161)	 (0.362)	 (0.383)	 (0.666)	 (0.663)	
Diversify	 0.075	 0.262	 0.727	 -0.431	 	 0.061	 0.101	 0.404	 0.312	 -0.433	 -0.182	
	 (0.140)	 (0.193)	 (0.523)	 (0.666)	 	 (0.146)	 (0.145)	 (0.404)	 (0.410)	 (0.659)	 (0.667)	
Market	Capitalization	 	     -0.238***	 -0.204**	 -0.199	 -0.169	 -0.022	 -0.044	
	 	     (0.092)	 (0.093)	 (0.145)	 (0.144)	 (0.191)	 (0.215)	
Market	Capitalization	*	Control	 	     0.044	 0.013	 -0.318	 -0.35	 -0.272	 -0.359	
	 	     (0.102)	 (0.102)	 (0.236)	 (0.232)	 (0.409)	 (0.364)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Adjusted	R^2	 0.0076	 0.0037	 0.0076	 0.0099	 	 0.0100	 0.0098	 0.0232	 0.0187	 0.0166	 0.0111	
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literature,	we	 find	a	negative	and	statistically	 significant	coefficient	 related	 to	 the	
acquisition	 of	 public	 targets.	 Consistent	 with	 the	 initially	 discussed	 theory	 that	








border	M&A,	 consistent	 with	 the	 broader	 literature	 including	 Chari,	 Ouimet	 and	
Tesar	(2010),	and	consistent	with	the	preliminary	results	presented	in	Tables	(4)	and	
(5).	In	particular,	notice	that	in	Panel	B	of	table	(5),	we	find	that	when	targets	are	
based	on	EM	markets	and	control	 is	not	acquired,	DM	acquirers	 tend	 to	yield	an	
average	CAR	of	 -0.34%,	which	heavily	 contrasts	with	 the	positive	 and	 statistically	
significant	CAR	of	1.06%,	presented	in	panel	A	of	table	(5)	and	in	the	tests	performed	
in	panel	B	of	table	(4),	which	is	further	confirmed	with	different	event	size	windows	
and	the	different	specification	on	Panel	A	of	 the	same	table.	This	 result	 is	heavily	
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generation	 of	 higher	 CAR’s,	 regardless	 of	 whether	 control	 is	 achieved	 or	 not.	 In	
particular,	 we	 find	 a	 coefficient	 associated	 with	 frontier	 market	 targets	















of	 an	 EM	 target	 by	 an	 EM	 acquirer	 seems	 to	 be	 associated	 with	 a	 positive	 and	





EM	 firms	experience	 an	 average	CAR	of	 just	 0.67%.	 Furthermore,	when	 including	
fixed	 effects	 in	 equation	 (4),	we	 find	 that	 the	 coefficient	 seized	 to	 be	 significant.	
Finally,	 the	 coefficient	 associated	 with	 the	 EM	 variable	 in	 equation	 (3)	 is	 only	
significant	at	a	10%	level.	Therefore,	we	take	caution	with	this	particular	result	and	
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do	 not	 derive	 significant	 conclusions	 from	 it.	 A	 puzzling	 result	 from	 equation	 (3)	






generation	 of	 significant	 CAR’s	 in	 sample	 5	 under	 a	 3-day	 event	 window,	 or	 the	
results	of	Panels	A,	which	suggest	that	with	control	an	emerging	market	firm	yields	
an	average	CAR	of	1.84%,	which	is	dwarfed	to	just	0.67%	without	control.	Equations	




statistically	 significant	 coefficient	 associated	 with	 the	 acquisition	 of	 control	 at	 a	
frontier	market	level.	Also,	the	acquisition	of	frontier	market	firms	without	control	
seems	 to	be	 related	with	a	negative	and	 statistically	 significant	 coefficient.	 These	
results	are	again	consistent	with	the	preliminary	information	yielded	by	table	(5).	In	
particular,	 notice	 that	 with	 the	 acquisition	 of	 control	 in	 Panel	 A	 of	 table	 (5),	 an	
emerging	market	firm	targeting	a	frontier	market	firm	experiences	an	average	CAR	






sample	 and	 alternative	 return	 generating	process.	 Second,	we	 also	 seem	 to	have	
obtained	 results	 that	 suggest	 that	 the	 acquisition	 of	 firms	 in	 frontier	markets	 by	
developed	market	firms	does	not	seem	to	yield	any	significant	CAR’s.	Third,	it	seems	
that	when	an	emerging	market	 firm	acquires	 control	 of	 a	 frontier	market	 firm,	 it	











higher	 CAR’s	 when	 the	 acquiring	 firm	 is	 a	 developed	 market.	 The	 results	 are	
consistent	 with	 the	 information	 presented	 in	 table	 (4)	 in	 Panel	 (B),	 in	 particular	
regarding	the	CAR’s	of	samples	(1)	and	(4),	which	are	statistically	indistinguishable	
from	0%	at	conventional	levels,	when	considering	a	3-day	event	window.	Consistent	
with	 the	broader	 literature,	we	 find	 again	 that	 public	 targets	 are	 associated	with	




explain	 the	 generation	 of	 higher	 CAR’s	 when	 the	 target	 is	 based	 in	 an	 emerging	
market.	In	particular,	notice	that	this	coefficient	is	associated	with	the	acquisition	of	








the	role	of	developed	market	acquirers.	 In	particular,	 the	 results	 suggest	 that	 the	
acquisition	 of	 control	 by	 emerging	 market	 acquirers	 is	 strongly	 related	 to	 the	
generation	of	higher	CAR’s.	The	results	also	seem	to	suggest	that	the	acquisition	of	
control	 by	 developed	market	 firms	 is	 associated	with	 a	 negative	 and	 statistically	
significant	effect	on	CAR	generation.		
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Table	 (6)	 provides	 an	 important	 analysis	 of	 the	 relevance	of	 control	 in	 the	 cross-
border	M&A	paradigm	with	material	managerial	significance.	With	it,	we	not	only	re-
confirm	 the	 results	 obtained	 by	 Chari,	 Ouimet	 and	 Tesar	 (2010)	 using	 a	 more	
sophisticated	return	generating	process	and	updated	sample,	but	we	also	provide	
further	insight	into	the	performance	of	frontier	market	firms.	We	find	that	control	is	
a	 significant	 variable	 in	 explaining	 the	 generation	 of	 higher	 cumulative	 abnormal	
returns	when	the	target	is	based	on	an	emerging	market	and	the	acquirer	is	based	
on	 a	 developed	market.	 The	 results	 suggest	 furthermore	 that	 developed	market	
acquirers	to	not	seem	to	earn	statistically	significant	CAR’s	when	acquiring	firms	in	
frontier	 markets.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 results	 strongly	 suggest	 that	 emerging	
market	firms	earn	positive	and	statistically	significant	abnormal	returns	when	control	











and	 frontier	market	 cross-border	M&A	deals.	 To	 that	 end,	 Table	 (7)	 presents	 the	





















	             
	 All-All	 	 DM-EM	 	 EM-EM	
		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 		 (7)	 (8)	 		 (9)	 (10)	
	             
Control	 	 -0,226	 	 -0,223	 	 -0,238	 	 -0,579	 1,051*	 	 0,886*	 1,617*	
	  (0.169)	 	 (0.170)	 	 (0.170)	 	 (1.201)	 (0.701)	 	 (0.493)	 (0.840)	
Employment	Laws	 0,408	 0,771	 	     0,476	 8,825	 	 -8,724**	 -8,758***	
	 (0.364)	 (0.936)	 	     (2.345)	 (6.372)	 	 (4.079)	 (3.260)	
Collective	Laws	 	  0,84*	 2,246**	 	   2,799	 -3,07	 	 5,534	 3,893	
	   (0.434)	 (0.958)	 	   (1.920)	 (5.040)	 	 (3.468)	 (4.003)	
Social	Security	Laws	 	    -0,128	 -2,185	 	 -3,888	 -11,404*	 	 -1,302	 -1,155	
	     (0.706)	 (1.624)	 	 (3.653)	 (6.251)	 	 (2.423)	 (2.203)	
Control	*	Employment	 	 -0,419	 	     -1,58	 -6,992	 	 7,857	 10,91**	
	  (1.018)	 	     (2.572)	 (4.817)	 	 (4.841)	 (4.711)	
Control	*	Collective	 	   -1,721	 	   -0,022	 1,836	 	 -2,983	 -2,902	
	    (1.064)	 	   (2.300)	 (3.879)	 	 (5.210)	 (7.441)	
Control	*	Social	Security	 	     2,655	 	 -0,235	 11,948*	 	 4,292	 8,24*	
	 	     (1.780)	 	 (4.217)	 (6.103)	 	 (3.677)	 (4.393)	
Diversify	 0,131	 0,138	 0,134	 0,139	 0,132	 0,141	 	 -0,555	 -0,531	 	 1,048*	 -0,41	
	 (0.136)	 (0.136)	 (0.136)	 (0.135)	 (0.136)	 (0.136)	 	 (0.498)	 (0.937)	 	 (0.619)	 (0.782)	
Public	Target	 -0,762***	 -0,82***	 -0,766***	 -0,821***	 -0,757***	 -0,815***	 	 -0,329	 -1,219	 	 -0,442	 0,097	
	 (0.142)	 (0.147)	 (0.142)	 (0.147)	 (0.142)	 (0.147)	 	 (0.517)	 (1.079)	 	 (0.509)	 (1.017)	
Transaction	Size	 -0,36***	 -0,336***	 -0,361***	 -0,334***	 -0,355***	 -0,334***	 	 -0,215	 -0,857	 	 0,601	 0,427	
	 (0.106)	 (0.105)	 (0.106)	 (0.105)	 (0.106)	 (0.105)	 	 (0.403)	 (1.045)	 	 (0.383)	 (0.682)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Adjusted	R^2	 0.0065	 0.0063	 0.0065	 0.0066	 0.0063	 0.0064	 	 0.0153	 0.1345	 	 0.0051	 0.0205	
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However,	 columns	 (3)	 and	 (4)	 seem	 to	 suggest	 that	 collective	 relations	 laws	 are	
statistically	significant	in	explaining	the	generation	of	higher	CAR’s.	We	take	caution	
in	interpreting	this	result	as	it	comes	from	a	very	broad	sample	with	all	deals	merged.	
However,	 it	 provides	 a	 first	 significant	 overview	of	 the	 importance	 that	 the	 legal	
environment,	 in	 this	 case	 specifically	 concerned	with	 collective	 bargaining,	might	









Table	 (1).	 In	unreported	 results,	we	 find	no	 statistical	 significance	of	 the	 relevant	
coefficients	concerned	with	the	legal	bodies	of	labour	on	samples	1,	3,	4	and	6.		
	
Equations	 (7)	 and	 (8)	 present	 the	 results	 of	 sample	 2.	 The	 results	 are	 striking.	 In	




loss	 generated	 by	 such	 a	 differential.	 In	 particular,	 in	 analysing	 the	 coefficient	 of	
interaction	 between	 control	 and	 social	 security	 laws	 in	 combination	 with	 the	
coefficient	exclusively	 concerned	with	 social	 security	 laws,	 it	 seems	 that	with	 the	




the	 index	 is	 constructed	 to	 take	 into	 account	 the	 benefits	 earned	 by	 employees	
under	exceptional	circumstances	such	as	old	age,	illness,	and	unemployment.	Each	




unemployment	 and	 public	 pension	 schemes	 for	 workers.	 By	 acquiring	 firms	
headquartered	in	environments	with	less	protection	benefits	for	workers,	we	argue	
that	the	acquisition	of	control	enables	the	parent	company	to	benefit	from	a	cheaper	






and	managerial	 best	 practices	 are	only	 likely	 to	 be	 transferred	 to	 the	 target	 firm	
when	control	is	obtained.	Acquisition	is	necessary	to	transfer	certain	work	processes	
from	 an	 acquiring	 firm,	 where	 labour	 is	 more	 expensive	 from	 a	 social	 security	
standpoint,	 into	the	target	firm	where	it	 is	cheaper.	This	type	of	transfer	can	take	






be	 two	 important	 conclusions	 to	 discuss.	 The	 first	 is	 concerned	 again	with	 social	
security	laws.	We	find	that	with	the	inclusion	of	fixed	effects	in	equation	(10),	the	
acquisition	of	control	leads	to	the	generation	of	higher	CAR’s	when	there	are	legal	
differentials	 at	 the	 social	 security	 level.	 We	 take	 caution	 in	 extracting	 further	
conclusions	from	this	result,	however,	the	reasoning	is	similar	to	the	one	presented	





observe	 in	 the	 previous	 specification,	 the	 acquisition	 of	 control	 is	 statistically	
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significant	 in	more	 than	 compensating	 for	 the	 lower	 abnormal	 returns	 described	
previously,	 and	 in	 fact	 leads	 to	 higher	 abnormal	 returns	 associated	 with	 the	












significant	 from	 a	 managerial	 perspective.	We	 suggest	 that	 in	 cases	 where	 legal	
differences	 are	 significant,	 acquiring	 firms	 which	 obtain	 control	 can	 exploit	 their	
workforce	in	a	considerably	more	efficient	manner	than	they	would	be	able	to	do	in	
their	native	 countries.	 In	particular,	 industries	which	are	heavily	 cyclical	 and	 thus	
would	require	significant	adjustments	to	the	level	of	labour	employed	depending	on	
economic	 circumstances	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 amongst	 the	most	 significant	winners	 of	
flexible	employment	laws.	We	also	relate	this	result	to	the	concept	of	rigid	labour	
markets	 presented	 in	 section	 II.XIII.	 Specifically,	 Nicoletti,	 Scarpetta	 and	 Boylaud	
(1999)	and	Forteza	and	Rama	(2001)	argue	that	rigid	labour	markets	lead	to	reduced	
competitiveness,	as	opposed	to	flexibility	which	can	benefit	cost	adjustments.	Since	
rigid	 labour	markets	 lead	to	market	 inefficiencies,	we	argue	that	one	of	 the	most	
important	 sources	 of	 cross-border	 M&A	 value	 within	 a	 legal	 framework	 comes	
precisely	from	the	efficiency	improvements	derived	from	the	potential	adjustment	









results.	 In	 particular,	 in	 table	 (4),	 we	 present	 two	 different	 return	 generating	
















ownership.	 Equation	 (5)	 suggests	 that	 the	 size	 of	 ownership	 is	 significant	 in	
explaining	CAR’s,	however,	after	the	inclusion	of	the	Control	dummy	in	equation	(6),	



















than	50%.	Time	trend	 is	a	variable	centred	around	2004	which	reflects	 the	year	 in	which	any	given	deal	was	
announced.	Public	Target	is	a	dummy	variable	which	is	equal	to	1	whenever	the	target	firm	is	publicly	traded.	







acquirers	 and	 frontier	market	 targets.	All	 regressions	 include	 fixed	effects	 at	 the	acquirer	 level.	All	 standard	
errors	are	robust	to	clustering	at	the	acquirer	level.	*,	**	and	***	denote	statistical	significance	at	the	10%,	5%	
and	1%	levels,	respectively.			
	         
Panel	A:	DM-EM	 	        
		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Control	 1,466***	 1,266**	 1,202**	 1,463***	 	 0,553*	 1,716***	 1,42**	
	 (0.563)	 (0.542)	 (0.545)	 (0.561)	 	 (0.301)	 (0.525)	 (0.556)	
Time	Trend	 	 0,001	 	      
  (0.003)	 	      
Public	Target	 	  -0,685	 	     
   (0.504)	 	     
Diversify	 	   -0,707	 	    
    (0.491)	 	    
Ownership	(%)	 	    0,859**	 0,606	 	  
	     (0.348)	 (0.475)	 	  
Ownership	(>95%)	 	      1,716***	 	
	       (0.635)	 	
Transaction	Value	 	       -0,467	
	 	       (0.412)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Adjusted	R^2	 0.0101	 0.0209	 0.0105	 0.0113	 0.0117	 0.0105	 0.0090	 0.0107	














         
Panel	B:	EM-EM	 	        
		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Control	 1,222**	 1,222**	 1,232**	 1,148**	 	 0,55*	 0,983*	 1,193**	
	 (0.504)	 (0.504)	 (0.487)	 (0.509)	 	 (0.331)	 (0.507)	 (0.503)	
Time	Trend	 	 0.0003	 	      
  (0.023)	 	      
Public	Target	 	  0,029	 	     
   (0.491)	 	     
Diversify	 	   1,137*	 	    
    (0.624)	 	    
Ownership	(%)	 	    0,733**	 0,476	 	  
	     (0.300)	 (0.444)	 	  
Ownership	(>95%)	 	      -0,283	 	
	       (0.608)	 	
Transaction	Value	 	       0,611*	
	 	       (0.351)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Adjusted	R^2	 0.0058	 0.0046	 0.0046	 0.0093	 0.0064	 0.0057	 0.0223	 0.0070	
	
	
         
Panel	C:	EM-FM	 	        
		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	
Control	 5,006***	 5,108**	 5,884***	 6,047***	 	 13,673***	 5,006***	 4,091**	
	 (1.784)	 (2.522)	 (1.870)	 (2.101)	 	 (3.806)	 (1.842)	 (1.758)	
Time	Trend	 	 -0,001	 	      
  (0.01)	 	      
Public	Target	 	  0,878***	 	     
   (0.324)	 	     
Diversify	 	   -2,082	 	    
    (3.296)	 	    
Ownership	(%)	 	    1,087	 -4,709***	 	  
	     (0.984)	 (1.806)	 	  
Ownership	(>95%)	 	      5,006*	 	
	       (2.804)	 	
Transaction	Value	 	       2,447	
	 	       (1.960)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Adjusted	R^2	 0.0311	 0.0157	 0.0032	 0.0023	 0.0043	 0.0508	 0.0111	 0.0037	
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diversification	 efforts	 of	 the	 firms	 involved,	 the	 public	 status	 of	 the	 target,	 the	
transaction	 size,	 the	 assets	 of	 the	 acquirer,	 the	 leverage	 of	 the	 acquirer,	 the	
acquirer’s	Tobin’s	Q	measure,	and	controls	for	the	payment	method	in	cash	and	in	
shares.	Consistent	with	the	results	obtained	previously,	we	study	the	robustness	of	









In	 Panel	 B	 we	 repeat	 the	 same	 specification	 described	 previously	 but	 within	 an	
Emerging	 Market-Emerging	 market	 setting.	 The	 results	 show	 a	 negative	 and	
statistically	 significant	 coefficient	 associated	with	 labour	 laws,	 and	 a	 positive	 and	
statistically	significant	coefficient	associated	with	employment	and	the	acquisition	or	


























	        
Panel	A:	DM-EM	 		
		 		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
	        
Employment	Laws	 	 2,241	 6,323	 	    
  (1.761)	 (4.605)	 	    
Collective	Laws	 	   3,969**	 2,377	 	  
    (1.887)	 (3.886)	 	  
Social	Security	Laws	 	     -4,159	 -8,256**	
	      (2.704)	 (3.867)	
Control	*	Employment	 	 -2,543	 -5,241	 	    
  (1.876)	 (3.247)	 	    
Control	*	Collective	 	   -2,612	 -3,582	 	  
    (2.017)	 (3.886)	 	  
Control	*	Social	Security	 	    1,423	 8,645**	
	      (2.704)	 (3.867)	
Diversify	 	 -0,52	 0,111	 -0,551	 0,088	 -0,458	 -0,299	
	  (0.534)	 (0.967)	 (0.529)	 (0.963)	 (0.508)	 (0.863)	
Public	 	 -0,754	 -1,945	 -0,799	 -1,838	 -0,64	 -1,194	
	  (0.485)	 (1.329)	 (0.492)	 (1.306)	 (0.468)	 (1.044)	
Transaction	 	 0,619	 -0,255	 0,705	 -0,304	 0,54	 -0,678	
	  (0.671)	 (1.275)	 (0.672)	 (1.277)	 (0.643)	 (1.183)	
Assets	 	 -0,432	 -2,866	 -0,466*	 -2,687	 -0,397	 -1,869	
	  (0.265)	 (1.860)	 (0.264)	 (1.830)	 (0.249)	 (1.612)	
Gearing	 	 0,019***	 -0,095	 0,02***	 -0,101	 0,018***	 -0,099	
	  (0.005)	 (0.247)	 (0.005)	 (0.255)	 (0.005)	 (0.237)	
Tobin's	Q	 	 -0,027	 -0,035**	 -0,025	 -0,031*	 -0,031	 -0,035**	
	  (0.026)	 (0.017)	 (0.027)	 (0.018)	 (0.026)	 (0.017)	
Cash	 	 0,917	 -0,295	 0,915	 -0,36	 0,875	 -0,563	
	  (1.761)	 (4.605)	 (1.887)	 (3.886)	 (2.704)	 (3.867)	
Stock	 	 1,164	 0,142	 1,011	 0,119	 1,062	 -0,022	
	  (1.761)	 (4.605)	 (1.887)	 (3.886)	 (2.704)	 (3.867)	
	        




		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Panel	B:	EM-EM	 		 		 		 		 		 		
		 		 (7)	 (8)	 (9)	 (10)	 (11)	 (12)	
	        
Employment	Laws	 	 -9,189**	 -6,499*	 	    
  (4.673)	 (3.422)	 	    
Collective	Laws	 	   7,49**	 6,668	 	  
    (3.777)	 (4.411)	 	  
Social	Security	Laws	 	     0,296	 0,224	
	      (3.984)	 (3.198)	
Control	*	Employment	 	 10,708*	 11,942**	 	    
  (5.621)	 (5.559)	 	    
Control	*	Collective	 	   -0,97	 0,118	 	  
    (4.996)	 (4.411)	 	  
Control	*	Social	Security	 	     5,362	 9,228**	
	      (3.984)	 (3.198)	
Diversify	 	 0,977*	 -0,495	 0,948	 -0,547	 0,959*	 -0,477	
	  (0.582)	 (0.799)	 (0.579)	 (0.798)	 (0.580)	 (0.794)	
Public	 	 -0,48	 -0,144	 -0,512	 -0,183	 -0,527	 -0,314	
	  (0.491)	 (0.955)	 (0.494)	 (0.945)	 (0.492)	 (0.937)	
Transaction	 	 1,574***	 0,87	 1,624***	 0,846	 1,569***	 0,807	
	  (0.445)	 (0.678)	 (0.443)	 (0.669)	 (0.445)	 (0.677)	
Assets	 	 -0,58***	 -0,835	 -0,584***	 -0,838	 -0,585***	 -0,857	
	  (0.156)	 (0.786)	 (0.156)	 (0.791)	 (0.158)	 (0.795)	
Gearing	 	 0,009	 0,025***	 0,009	 0,024***	 0,009	 0,025***	
	  (0.010)	 (0.009)	 (0.010)	 (0.009)	 (0.010)	 (0.009)	
Tobin's	Q	 	 -0,006**	 0,021***	 -0,006**	 0,021***	 -0,006**	 0,021***	
	  (0.003)	 (0.002)	 (0.003)	 (0.002)	 (0.003)	 (0.002)	
Cash	 	 -0,066	 1,73	 -0,078	 1,808	 -0,104	 1,818	
	  (4.673)	 (3.422)	 (3.777)	 (4.411)	 (3.984)	 (3.198)	
Stock	 	 -0,473	 1,022	 -0,57	 0,922	 -0,509	 1,007	
	  (4.673)	 (3.422)	 (3.777)	 (4.411)	 (3.984)	 (3.198)	
	        








The	 study	 of	M&A	has	 yielded	 countless	 puzzling	 results	 over	 the	 years.	 As	 time	
progresses,	new	and	innovative	ways	of	making	merger	deals	are	developed,	and	the	
motivations	 behind	 them	 become	more	 and	more	 complex	 as	more	 options	 and	
information	 become	 available	 to	 managers.	 The	 facilitation	 of	 foreign	 direct	
investment	over	the	past	decades	has	fuelled	a	significant	increase	in	cross-border	
M&A	activity.	In	fact,	academic	research	shows	that	we	are	currently	undergoing	the	
seventh	 major	 M&A	 wave,	 and	 that	 it	 is	 being	 driven	 by	 cross-border	 deals	
originating	from	emerging	economies.	Therefore,	the	study	of	the	sources	of	values	
for	 managers	 is	 paramount	 from	 a	 practical	 standpoint.	 The	 literature	 is	 vast	 in	
potential	 sources	 of	 value	 for	 acquiring	 shareholders.	 Some	of	 the	most	 relevant	













concerning	Developed	 and	 Emerging	Market	 acquirers,	 and	Developed,	 Emerging	
and	 Frontier	 Market	 targets,	 between	 1994	 and	 2013.	 We	 implement	 a	 Simple	
Market	model	 and	a	2-state	Market	model	 using	 a	 First	 order	Markov	Process	 in	
order	 to	 Measure	 CAR’s.	 We	 use	 a	 3-day	 and	 5-day	 event	 window.	 Given	 the	






0,59%	when	 considering	 our	 full	 sample,	 and	 of	 1,06%	when	 control	 is	 acquired,	




significant	CAR’s	when	 considering	 the	 full	 sample,	 but	 experience	a	positive	 and	
statistically	significant	CAR	of	1,16%	when	control	is	acquired,	and	a	target	is	based	








provide	further	 insight	 into	the	value	generation	in	frontier	markets.	 In	particular,	








value	 for	 the	 generation	 of	 abnormal	 returns	 in	 cross-border	 M&A	 deals	 at	 the	







with	 a	net	 average	 increase	 in	 abnormal	 returns	 at	 the	acquirer	 level.	 This	 result	
brings	 further	 robustness	 to	 the	conclusion	 that	control	has	value	 in	cross	border	
mergers	and	acquisitions,	but	it	also	reveals	that	social	security	is	important	in	the	
context	 of	 value	 creation	 for	 acquiring	 shareholders.	 Social	 security	 laws	 are	
specifically	 concerned	 with	 the	 level	 of	 benefits	 earned	 by	 employees	 under	









highly	 correlated	 with	 a	 higher	 corporate	 taxation	 environment.	 In	 particular,	
unemployment	benefits	are	funded	by	the	government	of	each	nation,	which	needs	
to	 finance	those	benefits.	We	argue	further	that	control	 is	paramount	 in	order	to	
benefit	from	the	less	rigid	social	security	environment.	In	particular,	with	control	it	is	
more	 likely	 that	 the	 acquiring	 firm	will	 adjust	 the	 goals	 and	uses	of	 the	 acquired	
resources,	such	as	labour.	By	applying	the	labour	resources	of	an	emerging	market	




more	 flexible	 labour	 force	 from	 the	 social	 security	 point	 of	 view,	 with	 improved	
productive	goals	derived	from	new	managerial	guidance.	Therefore,	our	argument	is	
based	on	the	combination	of	an	efficiency	consideration	derived	from	lower	costs,	




We	 also	 find	 that	 in	 an	 Emerging	 Market	 –	 Emerging	 Market	 specification,	 law	
differentials	at	 the	employment	 level	are	associated	with	 lower	abnormal	 returns	
when	control	is	not	acquired.	However,	and	similar	to	the	previous	specification,	we	
find	 that	 the	 same	body	of	employment	 laws	 is	 associated	with	a	net	 increase	 in	
abnormal	 returns	 when	 control	 is	 acquired.	 Employment	 laws	 are	 specifically	




particular,	 Nicoletti,	 Scarpetta	 and	 Boylaud	 (1999)	 and	 Forteza	 and	 Rama	 (2001)	
argue	 that	 the	 rigidity	of	 labour	markets	 can	heavily	 contribute	 to	a	 reduction	of	
competitiveness,	 as	 opposed	 to	 flexibility	 which	 can	 lead	 to	 cost	 adjustments.	
Specifically,	 the	 authors	 argue	 that	 the	 adjustment	 process	 of	 the	 allocation	 of	
productive	 resources,	 such	as	 labour,	 is	much	 lengthier	 and	more	 complex	under	
rigid	conditions,	which	leads	to	competitive	disadvantages.	We	argue	that	the	results	
of	 this	 study	 strongly	 support	 that	 premise.	 In	 particular,	 when	 a	 firm	 acquirers	
control	 of	 a	 firm	 where	 employment	 is	 more	 flexible	 will	 potentially	 gain	 a	
competitive	advantage	in	the	form	of	adaptation	to	a	changing	market	environment.	
We	 suggest	 that	 future	 studies	 can	 be	 focused	 on	 determining	 whether	 this	
competitive	 advantage	 will	 be	 higher	 in	 more	 cyclical	 industries,	 where	 labour	
adjustment	is	paramount	to	adjust	the	operational	cost	structure	of	firms.	We	argue	
that	 this	 result	 suggests	 that	 the	 legal	 environment	 concerning	 employment	
contracts,	and	specifically	the	costs	and	ease	of	dismissal,	as	well	as	the	potential	for	












certainly	 limitations	 that	 should	 be	 recognized.	 In	 particular,	 these	 are	 mainly	
concerned	with	the	availability	of	data.	The	main	limitation	of	this	study	is	concerned	
with	the	availability	of	information	concerning	emerging,	and	dramatically	more	so,	
















concerns	 the	empirical	methodology	of	measuring	and	 testing	CAR’s,	 future	work	
could	be	 focused	on	 the	 implementation	and	comparison	of	 results	when	using	a	
Smooth	Transition	Autoregressive	Model	 (STAR),	as	presented	 in	equation	 (20).	 It	
would	also	be	interesting	to	study	the	significance	of	CAR’s	when	implementing	non-
parametric	 tests	 with	 a	 simple	 market	 model.	 In	 what	 concerns	 the	 potential	












emerging	and	 frontier	markets,	and	 finally	 the	 role	 that	corruption	plays	 in	 those	
markets,	with	an	emphasis	on	the	capture	of	private	benefits	of	control.		
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